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ABSTRACT 
Drawing on a revised version ofHofstede's theory ofindustrialization and cultural change 
contained in his explanation of individualism and collectivism, the paper proposes that 
countries which are in the earlier stages of industrialization have a common culture that 
governs organizational behaviours. In-group/out-group particularist values that have been 
handed over from preindustrial society tend to overlay and replace impersonal and 
universalistic bureaucracies and market exchange typical ofindustrial society. The paper 
shows how these values shape the culture of organizations in Latin America, Africa and 
Germany around 1850. 
KEYWORDS: 
Culture, anthropology, sociology, industrialization, personal, impersonal, individualism, 
collectivism, in-group/out-groups, particularism, nepotism 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Most research in cross-cultural management de fines culture as distinct to nations, 
civilizations or groups, and it is generally taken for granted that cultural change is due to 
globalization. Following Hofstede, culture is regarded as the shared values and norms which 
distinguish groups from one another (Hofstede, 200 l: 10), and in line with diffusionist theory 
of culture (Carneiro, 2003), values and norms are assumed to change as the outcome ofthe 
interaction ofculturally distinct groups (e.g Festing, 2012). 
It has so far gone unnoticed that Hofstede presupposes a qualitatively different concept of 
culture when he explanations individualism and collectivism in his major work, Cultures 
Consequences (Hofstede, 200 l). Here, culture is implicitly defined as the values and norms 
that are specific to socio-economically defined types of society, and cultural change occurs 
when one type of society transforms into another. Thus, preindustrial and industrializing 
societies have a cOllectivist and in-group/out-group particularist culture, while advanced 
industrial society has individualist and universalist values and norms. In this view, nations 
and civilizations, which have similar socioeconomic conditions, also have a similar culture, 
which changes when the socioeconomic conditions change. This is how the c1assical 
sociologists, Marx (1990), Weber (1972) and Tonnies (1963) and theorists ofmodemization 
such as Kerr et al. (1960), Germani (1981), Inkeles and Smith (1974), Levy (1966), 
Ingiehart (1997) and North (1990) analyze culture and cultural change. In anthropology, it is 
known as evolutionism and contrasted with the diffusionist paradigm. (Carneiro, 2003). 
Taking the outset in a critical reading ofHofstede's chapter on individualism and 
collectivism in Cultures Consequences (Hofstede, 200 l), this paper argues that organizations 
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in industrializing countries have a similar culture which is distinct to this type of society. 
Present day developing countries as well as European countries during the industri al 
revolution in the 19th century belong to this category, and they consequently have a similar 
culture that affects the structure of organizations, relations between colleagues, between 
superiors and subordinates, and between business partners and c1ients. 
More concretely, the paper suggests that organizations during the earlier stages of 
industrialization have strong in-group/out-group particularist values and norms, which wholly 
or partially replace impersonal, universalist bureaucracy and market exchange. The in-group/ 
out-group particularism has its origin in preindustrial society while the bureaucracy and 
impersonal market exchange, which tend to be replaced by particularistic values, are a 
property ofthe emergent, industri al society. 
The first section ofthe paper contains a critical reading and revision ofHofstede's theory of 
industrialization and cultural change. While his general, theoreticai perspective is an 
important alternative to the current view on culture and cultural change, the detail s ofhis 
cultural explanation are in several respects ambiguous and insufficient. His central theoretical 
labels, collectivism and individualismluniversalism are, each in their own way, one-sided, 
and he misses a number of insights from anthropology and sociology that explain how people 
cooperate and exchange goods and services in the different types of society. The review 
identifies the limitations and suggests solutions, conc1uding in an ideal typical modelof 
industrializing society which shows its position between the preindustrial and industrial types 
ofsociety. 
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The second part of the paper shows how the revised concept of industrializing society and 
culture corresponds to observations of organizations in Latin America, Africa and Germany 
in the 19th century. The tindings suggest that the organizational cultures are not unique to 
nations or civilizations but specific to industrializing society, and they change, not primarily 
because nations or civilizations interact, but because ofthe continued expansion and 
consolidation of industrial, capitalist society. 
PREINDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AND CUL TURE 
Hofstede describes preindustrial society as kinship based, culturally collectivist and in-
group/out-group particularist. People live in extended families organized in clans whose 
members intern ally take care of each other and put the well-being ofthe group above 
individual interests. Drawing on Tonnies'distinction, he refers to the collectivist, preindustrial 
society and culture as a Gemeinschaft type in contrast to the individualist, industri al 
Gesellschaft type of society and culture (Hofstede, 2001: 211). 
Hofstede's description ofpreindustrial society and culture correctly summarizes the way 
c1assical sociology and theories of modernization approach preindustrial culture, but a c10ser 
reading ofhis discussion reveals a number ofshortcomings. In the first place, the term 
collectivism which he uses to describe the culture ofpreindustrial culture is too one sided to 
serve as an adequate, general characterization. Collectivism refers to the values and norms 
that in-group members feel towards each other and to the collectivity, but does not inc1ude 
their feelings and attitudes towards those who are not members ofthe group, the out-group 
members. As Hofstede himselfpoints out, out-group relations, no less than in-group relations, 
are a central aspect ofpreindustrial society, and using a definition which exclusively refers to 
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in-group relations buiids an unfortunate, reductionist bias into the analytical perspective. The 
term in-group/out-group particularism, which Hofstede sees as a set ofvalues associated with 
collectivism, covers both aspects, the collectivist solidarity between in-group members and 
the negative attitudes to strangers, and it is therefore a more adequate label. (ibid: 238,243). 
It is also an open question ifthe distinction between in-groups and out-groups is a dichotomy. 
In a summary of a large number of ethnographic reports, Sahlins (1968) suggests that the 
difference is a continuum of social distance with pure in-group solidarity at one extreme and 
pure out-group opportunism and enmity at the other end. Social distance depends primarily 
on kinship in the sense that there is a very small social distance between members ofthe 
elosest in-group, the nuelear family; it is larger between members ofthe nearest descent 
group, the lineage, and social distance increases further at the levelof elan and tribe social 
distance is largest to members of other tribes, the pure out-groups. Close in-group members 
are expected to be mutually altruistic, helpful and trustworthy while pure out-group members 
by default are expected to be hostile, opportunistic and untrustworthy, and it is considered 
perfectly legitimate to treat them in the same way. 
Kinship is not the only factor which determines social distance. Neighbours who are 
genealogicaIly distant are expected to be mutually helpful and trustworthy and thus relate to 
each other as more or less elose kino In the same way, the social distance between friends is 
short; they are expected to be mutually altruistic and trustworthy even ifthey are distant in 
kinship terms. The social distance in a marriage is likewise short, even ifthe husband and 
wife have no com mon ancestors. Brothers, friends, married couples are in-groups whose 
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members intern ally share a collectivist solidarity which differentiate them from people with 
whom they have more distant relations, irrespectively ofkinship distance. 
Hofstede observes that the in-group/out-group particularism has one crucial consequence, 
namely that positive interaction between out-group members is difficult or impossible, and 
that a positive exchange between out-group members therefore presupposes that they become 
members of each other's in-groups (Hofstede, 2001). But he does not explain how to 
accomplish this transfonnation in preindustrial society, and we may therefore again turn to 
anthropology for an extension ofhis theoreticai account. 
Since Mauss, anthropologists have argued that the exchange that the exchange of gifts and 
favours serve to shorten social distance and create in-group relations (Mauss, 1990, Sahlins, 
1968). When strangers meet and exchange gifts they interact with the same altruism as closer 
in-group members, and by doing so, they inc1ude each other in their respective in-groups. 
Offering a gift is an invitation to establish a friendship, and when the recipient accepts the 
gift, he or she also accepts the moral obligation to offer a return gift at some undefined point 
in time. In the gift exchange the two persons interact as in-group members who are expected 
to be mutually altruistic and trustworthy. 
The transformation of out-group relations into closer in-group relations by means of gifts is 
particularly important in trade between strangers, who need to build trust. Intertribal trade is 
therefore usually accompanied by a lavish display ofhospitality, and the trade itselfmay 
become similar to a mutual exchange of gifts and favours between friends . (Sahlins, 1968). 
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Hofstede also lacks a theory ofpreindustrial authority. He is famous for his concept ofpower 
distance, but we are not told ifthe in-group/out-group particularism of preindustrial society 
affects the way authority is used. Are the relations between superior and subordinate in 
collectivist in-groups different from the situation that occurs when superior and subordinate 
are related as out-group members? 
Weber complements Hofstede on this point. In in-groups, Weber argues, authorities are 
benevolent and caring; the authority is patemalistic and subordinates are supposed to show 
filial pierty towards the superior. When the subordinates are members of out-groups, on the 
other hand, the authority tums "Machiavelli sti c" and opportunistic, and the subordinates 
relate to the authority with a corresponding out-group attitude. (MUnch, 1990). The power 
distance may be high in both in-group and out-group relations, but it is manifested in 
different ways according to the position on the in-group/out-group continuum of superiors 
and subordinates. Fathers, lineage heads and chiefs are benevolent in-group authorities but in 
out-group relations, the benevolence disappears and they tum exploitative and mistrusting. 
Finally, as Hofstede has neither a theory of gift-exchange, nor a concept of in-group/out-
group particularist authority, he also misses the role that extraordinary gifts have in 
developing and sustaining positions of status and power. In preindustrial communities, an 
individual's authority is usually a function ofthat persons's position in the kinship system, 
but it mayaiso be the result of a strategic use of extraordinary gifts. All gifts place the 
recipient under a moral obligation to reciprocate at some future, undefined point in time, and 
the obligation stays with the recipient until he or she has produced the counter gift. 
Extraordinary favours and gifts that are so large that the recipient is unable to reciprocate at 
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the same level morally obligate the recipient to reciprocate without having the means to do 
so, and he or she consequently becomes perpetually indebted to the giver. In anthropological 
terms, the giver becomes a Big Man who can call on the morally indebted recipient when he 
wishes, and the latter becomes his dependent retainer. The Big Man is a friend because the 
gift creates a closer relationship between the parties, and he is has power over the recipient 
due to the latter's moral and personal dependence; In Pitt-River's words, the relationship 
between the Big Man and his retainer is a "lopsided friendship", i.e. a benevolent in-group 
relationship with a short social distance and a clear power difference between the parties 
(pitt-Rivers, 1973; Sahlins, 1968). 
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AND CULTURE 
In modem, industrial and urban society, Hofstede argues, the large kinship structures oftribe, 
clan and the extended family have dissolved, and the nuclear family is now the single, 
dominant kinship unit. The nuclear family consists of two generations only; grandparents are 
sent to homes for the aged, and the number of one-parent families is rising. Accompanying 
the disintegration of the large kinship units, the moral bonds between in-group members 
become looser, and individualism replaces collectivism. "Everyone is expected to look after 
him/herself and his/her family only" (Hofstede, 2001:225). 
In organizations, managers subject employees to the same rules that apply to everyone in the 
same job regardless oftheir group-identities, and they move employees around individually 
according to utilitarian motives, deliberately ignoring in-group/out-group differences. 
Collectivist bonds and mutual helpfulness between employees in the organization are viewed 
with suspicion because it may lead to nepotism: "some companies have a rule that if an 
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employee marries another employee, one ofthem must leave". (Hofstede, 2001:237). It is 
also considered irrational and inappropriate ifbusiness people do not treat all customers alike 
and according to the same economic criteria of profit maximization: "preferential treatment 
of one's customers is considered bad business" (ibid: 238). 
On this background, Hofstede conc1udes that modem, industri al society has an individualist 
and universalist culture. The social structures ofkinship which sustained the in-group/out-
group particularism of preindustrial society have disintegrated and been replaced by 
universalist and individualist norms and values in private and professionallife. 
Hofstede's conc1usion brings up two questions. First, is lif e in the private sphere offamily 
really universalist and individualist? And secondly, ifthis is not the case, does it then makes 
sense to refer to modem, industri al society as an undifferentiated, universalist and 
individualist culture? 
Hofstede's own discussion offamily life in urban, industri al society does not suggest that 
values are universalist and individualist. Those who "take care of ( ... ) their immediate family 
only" (ibid: 225) are in-group members who act altruistically and with solidarity in their 
relations to the other members ofthe social unit, and they draw a distinction to non-family 
members whom they do not feel the need to care for. Family life, as it appears in Hofstede's 
own description is, in fact, neither universalist nor individualist but in-group/out-group 
particularist. There is no qualitative difference between the modem family and preindustrial 
kinship. Rather, the dissolution ofthe large, preindustrial kinship units have resulted in 
smaller kinship units which retain the particularistic norms ofpreindustrial society. In this 
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reading, the modem, nuclear family is ahistorical remnant of preindustrial society and 
culture. 
Ifwe maintain with Hofstede that industri al bureaucracy and market exchange operate 
according to universalist and individualist principles, it follows that modem, industri al 
society and culture is not an undifferentiated whole but split into two spheres of life. On the 
one hand, people have a personal and private life which is govemed by particularist values, 
and on the other, they are employees in organizations or buyers and sellers in the market 
folIowing impersonal, universalist and individualist norms and rules. In other words, modem, 
industri al society is not simply universalist and individualist as argued by Hofstede. Only the 
impersonal sphere ofbureaucracy and market exchange corresponds to this definition, not the 
sphere of personal and private life, and his overall label is consequently biased. 
The terms "personal" and "impersonal" are from Weber (1978) who uses the negative term to 
indicate that the bureaucracy and market exchange of industri al capitalism exclude 
particularist, personal relations, both those of preindustrial society and their remnants in the 
private sphere ofindustrial society. Industrial, capitalism comes into being with the rise of 
impersonal market exchange and bureaucracy, which delegitimizes the personal, particularist 
relations ofpreindustrial society. The impersonal social relations, Weber argues, are the 
hallmark of modem rational capitalism and sets this type of society apart from all 
precapitalist societies. 
The Weberian distinction which underlies Hofstede's description ofindustrial culture, is also 
the foundation ofHabermas' distinction between "lifeworld" and "system". With the rise of 
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industri al capitalism, a system of impersonal bureaucracy and market exchange develops, 
splitting society and culture into two spheres. In contrast to preindustrial society which is 
"segmentally differentiated" into a variety of groups with in-group/out-group particularist 
values, industri al society is "functionally differentiated" into a rational and impersonal 
system, and a personallife-world which contains the remnants ofthe in-group/out-group 
particularist culture of the preindustrial, segmentally differentiated society (Habermas, 1987) 
Critical Weberians such as Habermas (1987) and Ritzer (2008) regard the impersonality of 
modem industrial capitalism as dehumanizing because it delegitimizes the personal relations 
of family and friendship. As argued in the next section, this may be one of the reasons why 
individuals in industrializing societies reject impersonal, universalist social relations and 
continue to cooperate and exchange goods and services according to the norms and rules of 
preindustrial society. 
INDUSTRIALIZING SOCIETY AND CUL TURE 
Practically all ofthe countries which have high collectivist scores in Hofstede's empirical 
study are developing countries and thus industrializing. His description of organizational 
cultures in these countries suggests that the organizations differ from those of industrial 
society in two ways. The in-group/out-group particularist values and social relations are 
stronger, and they are not con fine d to the private sphere but flow into modes of cooperation 
and exchange that are expected to be impersonal and universalist in industri al society. 
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For instance, Hofstede finds strong in-group/out-group particularism in e.g. schools where 
"students from the same ethnic or family background as the teacher or other school officials 
expect preferential treatment ( ... )" (ibid: 235), and in Peruvian organizations where outsiders 
are not accepted and mistrusted (ibid: 238). In these organizations, people prefer to interact 
according to in-group/out-group particularism typical ofpreindustrial society, and they reject 
impersonal bureaucracies and market exchange: 
" ... only natural persons are worthy oftrust, and via these persons their friends and 
colleagues, but not impersonal entities like companies. So, in the collectivist society the 
personal relationship prevail over the task and over the company and should be established 
first; in the individualist society, in contrast, the task and the company are supposed to 
prevail over any personal relationships (Italics in the text. ibid: 239). 
Instead of excluding the particularistic relations from business and organizations as it is the 
norm in universalist, industri al society, employees and business people continue to interact as 
it is custom in preindustrial society, at the cost of impersonal, rules and roles. The result is a 
culture which is not clearly differentiated into a personal and impersonal sphere of life as it is 
the case in industri al society; the differentiation is "blunted" or "incomplete" (Schimank, 
2007) due to the inflow of personal, in-group/out-group relations into the supposedly 
impersonal sphere of organizations and business. 
Why do employees and business people reject the impersonal modes of exchange and choose 
to continue to run organizations and do business along in-group/out-group particularist lines? 
Hofstede does not offer an answer, but one explanation may be that it is due to cultural 
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inertia. There are no impersonal social relations or universalist values in preindustrial society, 
and if people continue to understand cooperation and exchange as usual in preindustrial 
society, there is no reason to expect that they should aet impersonally or identify with 
universalist values. 
Another reason may be that impersonality and universalism are perceived as problematie and 
unattractive because they delegitimize the old values and norms demanding that incumbents 
of impersonal roles must renounee their collectivist commitment to members of their in-
group and cease to discriminate against strangers. 
A person who treats an in-group member impersonally abstracts from his or her in-group 
obligations and treats the other person as everybody else without the special care reserved for 
in-group members. Doing so may lead to feelings of guilt, criticism from other members of 
the in-groups and ostracism. Furthermore, if in-groups cannot be chosen as partners in 
business exchange and as employees, it is also impossible to benefit from the solidarity and 
trust ofthe in-group. Ignoring in-group roles in favour ofimpersonal roles a manager or 
business person forfeits the solidarity which makes trustworthy cooperation possible. At the 
other end ofthe in-group/out-group continuum, the demand that strangers should not be 
mistrusted, discriminated against or exploited because oftheir social identity as outsiders 
may be perceived as naIve and risky, and as an attempt to delegitimize one's legitimate right 
to exploit out-group members. 
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The folIowing diagram sums up in ideal-typical fonn the basic characteristics of 
industrializing society, comparing it to the old, preindustrial and the (potentially) future, 
industri al society: 
Tabel l. 
Preindustrial society Industrializing society Industrial society 
Hegemonic in-gro up/out- Weaker, but still highly Weak in-group/out-group 
group particularist social influential, in-group out- particularist social relations 
relations and values. group particularist social and values are confined to 
relations and values which the personal sphere of 
overlap with and replace private life 
impersonal and 
universalistic bureaucracy An autonomous, impersonal 
and market exchange sphere of universalistic 
bureaucracy and market 
exchange is in place outside 
the personal and 
particularistic sphere of life. 
Industrializing society is in transition between preindustrial and industri al society. The in-
group/out-group particularism and kinship may be weaker compared to preindustrial society, 
but it is considerably stronger compared to industrial society. The preindustrial nonns are not 
abandoned by incumbents ofbureaucratically defined, impersonal roles and they continue to 
shape the way go ods and services are exchanged, in spite of impersonal and universalist 
criteria of profit maximization. 
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ORGANIZA TIONS AND BUSINESS IN LATIN AMERICA, AFRICA AND GERMANY 
IN THE 19th CENTURY 
The purpose now is to show that the organizational cultures of Latin America, Africa and 
Germany in the 19th century in important respects are similar and correspond to the 
combination of values and norms typical of industrializing society as suggested above. The 
data used in support of the hypothesis consists of observations from the literature on cross-
cultural management and from German, economic history. Osland et al. 's paper on Latin 
American organizations (Osland et el. 1999) and Fadiman's book on African organizations 
and business take their point of departure in the current view on culture as distinct to groups. 
Kocka's perspective is sociological; like Weber, he analyzes the organizational culture of 
German companies during the industrialization as the values and norms that correspond to the 
transitional stage of German economy and society (Kocka 1978 in Rueschemeyer, 1986). 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IN LATIN AMERICA 
In the paper "Organizational Implications of Latin American Culture. Lessons for the 
expatriate manager" Osland et al. (1999) note that "Latin American cultures generally have a 
fairly low levelof trust in people who are not family or c10se friends. When you are in 
serious trouble, Latin Americans say that you can only trust your family which they define as 
the extended family ( ... ) families watch out for their members in return for loyalty". In line 
with Hofstede (2001) and Sahlins (1968), they explain that "In-group/out-group behavior is 
an aspect of collectivist cultures in which in-groups receive preferential treatrnent compared 
to out-groups that are treated with hostility and distrust" (ibid: 227). 
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The in-group/out-group partieularism tends to replace and particularize bureaueracies: 
A visiting U.S. professor teaehing in Central America for the first time horrified his Latin 
American colleagues by spending most ofhis free time ehatting with his M.B.A. students in 
the cafeteria. The rest ofthe faeulty preferred a friendly, but more distant relationship. The 
professor was shocked to discover, after grading his exams, that the students with whom he 
had the closest relationships had the lowest grades. These students were counting on their 
friendship with the professor to guarantee their grades beeause this is how they would show 
their loyalty to their friends" (ibid: 222). 
The different relationships the loeal professors and the US professor have to their students 
correspond to two different positions on the in-group/out-group eontinuum. The loeal 
professors keep their relationships to students in a neutral but friendly position in whieh the 
in-group obligations are suffieiently weak to allow them to act without being under moral 
pressure. The U.S. professor, in contrast, ehooses to establish closer in-group relations 
creating the expectation in the students that he will give them preferential treatment in the 
exam, disregarding the faet that grading is supposed to be impersonal and follow 
universalistic criteria. 
The students have strong in-group/out-group particularist values, and they do not see that 
there should be a clear border between the personal in-group obligations and the impersonal 
rules. The professor who enjoys the colleetivist bonds he has established with the students, on 
the other hand, draws a much sharper distinction between his impersonal role as examiner 
and his personal and private relationships. Re is not aware that a eultural difference exists, 
but eventually he realizes that the Latin American students "did not understand that U.S. 
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Americans are more likely to separate the particularistic demand of personal relationships 
from the universalistic, bureaucratic demands ofthe job" (ibid: 222). 
Another example from the same paper shows how extraordinary gifts create or sustain a Big 
Man authority that replaces the impersonal sphere ofbureaucraticy. 
"In the 1970s Asbjom took over the directorship of a development agency in Colombia from 
a man who walked around with a wad ofbills in his pocket, dispensing largesse. The previous 
director was also an expatriate, but his management style as "the grand patron" closely tit the 
communities' leamed behaviours about how a boss should behave. Therefore Asbjom took a 
more bureaucratic stance (these are the organization's resources, not mine, and let's all 
follow procedures that encourage development rather than dependence)." (ibid: 228). 
According to anthropological theory, the exchange of gifts in preindustrial society serves to 
shorten social distance and create closer in-group bonds. In the business school example, the 
U.S. professor and his Latin American students who spend time together in the canteen may, 
for instance, have paid for coffee and drinks by tums as tokens of friendship. The former 
director of the development project takes a step further handing out extraordinary gifts, which 
the recipients cannot reciprocate and as a consequence. Making them morally dependent he 
becomes able to run the project as a preindustrial, benevolent Big Man. By handing out gifts 
and favours he moves his relationship to the peasants closer to the collectivist in-group pole 
ofthe in-group/out-group continuum, and because the gifts are large, he becomes more 
powerful. He does not stick to the impersonal roles which de tines his authority as director, 
but chooses instead to run the project as a Big Man, replacing the impersonal rules with 
preindustrial, personal norms. 
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Asbjom reacts in the same way as the U.S. professor. Both expect that the organizations 
ought to run according to impersonal and universalist principles and that personal, 
particularist relations must be isolated in the private sphere of life, and they react negatively 
when they are confronted with behaviours that do not correspond to these norms. That is, 
they evaluate the organizational culture of the industrializing, Latin American countries, 
using the values and norms ofthe highly industrialized U.S. as benchmark. 
ORGANIZA TIONAL CULTURE IN AFRICA 
Africa is rapidly industrializing, but as Fadiman (2000) argues, organizations and business 
relations continue to rely on tribal norms and social relations. Fadiman (2000) describes 
organizations in black South Africa in this way: 
"Africans organize their companies like extended families. The founder, an elder, is placed at 
the center of several imaginary circ1e composed of near and then more distant kino Since they 
collectively direct the enterprise, we may call them CEO and board of directors. Nonetheless, 
unlike American executives, they may all be kino A second circ1e may hold men of middle 
age, the sons and sons-in-Iaw ofthe founding generation. They are not promoted for merit but 
remain subordinate to every elder throughout their lives. Over time, outer circ1es develop ( ... ) 
One circ1e could certainly hold adult grandchildren ofthe founding generation; others might 
contain more distant relatives, their friends, and friends of friends. All may perceive 
themselves as members of the extended family ( ... ). (ibid: 80). 
The highly in-group collectivist culture is only one side ofthe coin. The members ofthe in-
group regard individuals who are not kin or friends negativelyas members of out-groups: 
"most Africans view those with whom they lack ties as more than competitors; they are 
potential predators and not to be trusted" (ibid: 60). 
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The employees of the African firm are related to each other as in-group members with 
varying degrees of genealogical and social distance between them, and as a group they 
differentiate themselves sharply from outsiders in conformity with social practice in the old 
preindustrial vilages. The legitimacy of the head of the company resides in his position in the 
kin-group and not in the impersonally defined role as CEO. His authority is patemalistic and 
benevolent, and subordinates are like children who are supposed to obey with filial piety. As 
a Kwa Zulu manager told Fadiman: "My employees are more than men who work for me. 
They are my friends. They are more than my friends. They are my sons. How else could I 
control them?" 
Compared to modem, industri al society and organizations in which personal relations are 
limited to the private sphere of life and it is expected that the bureaucracy which constitutes 
the backbone of organizations operates independently of in-group/out-group particularism, 
the African organization is incompletely differentiated. Particularist relations dominate where 
a U.S. observer would expect to see impersonal and universalist roles and rules. 
Business people and employees in govemmental organizations exchange gifts and favours 
folIowing the rules of reciprocity found in studies of preindustrial communities: 
"Assume, for instance, that your firm seek licenses from a govemment department headed by 
as Sotho. Ifyou pay another Sotho a fee to help procure them, your firm incurs no further 
obligation; your payment ends the relationship. Ifthe Sotho works without a fee, however, he 
performs a favour. Your firm therefore owes him a favour to be granted at his request. Ifhe 
subsequently provides additional favours, your sense of obligation should intensify. Ifyou 
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return the favours (or anticipate his needs and provide them) he becomes increasingly 
obligated in return" (ibid: 72). 
Receiving a gift creates a moral obligation and sense of gratitude in the recipient and when 
the return gift has been produced, the first giver becomes obligated in return; the exchange 
moves the relationship towards the in-gro up pole, strengthening the collectivist solidarity of 
the giver and the recipient. 
Business men also use extraordinary gifts and favours strategically as a means to create or 
enhance their authority as Big Men, or Fadiman prefers to say, the authority of an "Elder 
Brother": 
"Wealthy Bantu business men follow what we might call an 'Elder Brother Strategy' seeking 
both communal and commercial status through recurrent acts of generosity to subordinates. 
Their goal is to place recipients under permanent obligation ( ... ) Those receiving the favours 
take on the role ofyounger brothers. Unable to repay the favours they receive in equal 
measure, younger brothers pay symbolically by providing token gifts and acts of deference, 
while placing time and energy at the elder brother's disposal". (ibid: 73) 
The exchange of gifts and favours not only accompany market exchange as a private 
relationship between the two parties; it tends to replace impersonal and universalist market 
exchange. The extraordinary gift subordinates the recipient to the personal authority ofthe 
giver, and instead ofexchanging goods and services at arms' length and according to the 
person independent criteria of profit maximization, the morally dependent recipient is 
morally obligated to give preferential treatment to the generous Big Man. 
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In his study of Ghanaian companies, Kuada ( 1994) offers examples of organizations where 
universalistic bureaucracies are somewhat more consolidated as the organization's ground 
rules, but, here too, they are overruled and repIaced by in-group/out-group particularism: 
"ConfidentiaI reports are scarcely confident to those who have family or ethnic links within 
the managerial circles of their organizations, and transfers and promotion s are far more likely 
to be influenced through personnel connections than through meritocratic performance ( ... ) 
and job rotations are grounded not so much by the concern for performance or job-reIated 
goal attainment but by the need to advance the career prospect of specific subordinates 
(ibid:75). 
The organizations which Kuada describes are expected to follow meritocratic procedures and 
ignore in-group/out-group identities but they nevertheIess deviate from this principle 
allowing personal and particularist norms and obligations to influence decisions which ought 
to be impersonaI and universalistic. Managers give in-group members preferentiaI treatment 
and discriminate against those who are more distant, in spite ofthe existence ofthe 
impersonaI bureaucracy. 
ORGANIZA TIONAL CUL TURE IN GERMANY 1850 
Kocka's historicai study ofSiemens during the early days ofGermany's industrialization 
(Kocka, 1978) suggests that the company's organizational culture at that time was similar to 
the culture of the Latin American and African organizations as shown above: 
"As in Great Britain fifty years earlier, or in the deveIoping countries today, it was difficult 
for German factory-owners around 1850 to find qualified and reliabIe officials and office 
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staffto perform those tasks which the entrepreneur could not closely control himself. Under 
the constant threat offraud, employers found loyalty and honesty even more important 
criteria in the selection of staffthan training and ability. As far as possible, employers ofthe 
time put relatives and close friends into those positions which carried decision-making power 
and which were hard to control. ( ... ) Often the senior salaried employee of the company was 
the brother or cousin ofthe founder, and the first general manager his closest friend from 
school or military service ( ... ). Thus, family loyalty provided the control - albeit informal -
necessary for the successful decentralization ofresponsibility and control (Kocka, 1978. In 
Rueschemeyer, 1986) 
If the owner uses meritocratic criteria when he employs managers ignoring whether they are 
socially close or distant, he ends up with untrustworthy and opportunistic strangers in 
managerial roles. As strangers, the managers are out-group members, and according to their 
preindustrial norms they feel free to take advantage of the owner and his organization; they 
break the impersonal rules of the organization and replace them by their own, personal 
interests. When the owner chooses to employ family and friends instead ofusing impersonal 
and universalist criteria of employment, he avoids the out-group opportunism, and he can 
now run the organization as an in-group authority in much the same way as the Kwa Zulu 
manager. 
Importantly, the owner does not react as the U.S professor and Asbjom in Latin America both 
of whom seek to maintain the purity of the impersonal bureaucracy drawing a clear border 
between the personal and the impersonal spheres. Rather, he shifts from a situation in which 
out-group behaviours replace the impersonal bureaucracy to a situation in which in-group 
solidarity replaces the impersonal and universalistic princip les. In other words, where the 
U.S. professor and Asbjom attempt to tum their organizations into modem, industrial entities 
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with an autonomous bureaucracy, relegating particularist relations to the private sphere, the 
owner of Siemens gives up on this principle and opts instead for a solution that conforms to 
the culture ofindustrializing society, namely to rely on in-group solidarity at the cost of 
impersonality and universalism. 
CONCLUSION 
Classical sociology developed as an attempt to explain the economic, social and cultural 
transformations produced by the industrial revolution ofEurope in the 19th century. Later, 
theorists of modemization applied the sociological framework to the developing countries 
where a transformation, similar to the one that took place in Europe a century earlier, was 
under way. In both contexts, researchers found that the process ofindustrialization involved a 
disintegration ofthe preindustrial in-group/out-group particularist social structures and 
values, and the rise of new forms of impersonal and universalistic modes of exchange and 
cooperation. 
Today, the rich nations ofthe West are industri al while the developing countries are in 
transition from preindustrial to industri al society and they have organizational cultures 
similar to those which existed in Europe during the industri al revolution. As intermediate 
between the two types of society, industrializing countries, today and in the past, have two 
cultural characteristics. On the one hand, they have strong socio-cultural structures and values 
that have been handed over from the earlier, agrarian and kinship based society, and on the 
other, there are emergent forms of cooperation and exchange typical of industrial capitalism 
which, however, in many cases are repressed and replaced by in-group/out-group particularist 
norms. 
23 
As implied by Hofstede's explanation ofindividualism and collectivism and the sociological 
tradition, culture is not simply the shared values and norms that distinguish groups such as 
nations or civilizations from one another, and it does not change only because these groups 
interact. Culture is also, and perhaps primarily, the values and norms that correspond to 
different types of society, and it changes as the consequence of the socio-economic 
transformations that lead from one type of society to another. 
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